n. any position or theoretical perspective that holds one or more of the following: (a) that the rules of logic are reflective of the way the mind works, so that logic is persuasive only because it “fits” the working of the mind; (b) that truth is established by verifying the correspondence of external facts to ideas in the mind; (c) that epistemological questions can be answered by an understanding of the laws by which the mind works; and (d) that the meanings of words are established by the ideas corresponding to them. The term is generally used as a criticism of particular approaches or theories on the grounds that they make psychological processes that are accidental and contingent the foundation of knowledge: Because it takes the contingent to be fundamental, psychologism will be led toward epistemological relativism. This critical use of the term was introduced by German philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), whose work in mathematical
logic can be seen as a rigorous attempt to eliminate psychologism. It was later taken up by the logical positivists (see logical positivism) and, from a different perspective, by German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), who used it to criticize the British traditions of empiricism and associationism. The term was later turned against Husserl’s own work by German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976); see existential phenomenology.